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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH

RAINER F. HUCK,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14581

ROBERT T. HAYES,
Defendant/Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CA3E
This is an action brought by Plaintiff to compel
specific performance by Defendant under the terms of an
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, or, in the
alternative, for general damages.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

This case was tried before the Honorable Maurice
Harding, sitting by designation in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County.

The Court,

sitting without a jury, entered judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff ordering Defendant to assign to Plaintiff all
of Defendant's rights, title and interest to a Salt Lake
County house, ordering damages for loss of rents and
attorney's fees, and ordering credits to be given to
Defendant.

(R. 139-140)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmance of the
lower court decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Rainer Huck takes issue with the statement
of facts as presented by the Appellant in his brief.

The

statement omits many items essential for an understanding
of this action and states facts which were controverted and
in terms solely of Defendant's own evidence.

For this reason,

the findings of fact, as found by the Trial Court, shall be
included herein with references to the transcript and exhibits
included under each subdivision.

Further facts supplementing

these findings will be integrated into Appellant's argument.
The Trial Court found the following facts:
1.

Defendant has been engaged in the rental and

leasing of income property in metropolitan Salt Lake City
for at least the past 16 years, and has acquired rental
properties in his own name and jointly with his brother.
(Tr. 155-157)
2.

As of March, 1974, Defendant claimed an interest

in a house and property located at 1161 East Bueno Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Said interest was claimed by virtue

of Defendant's assignment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract
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dated July 3, 1964, between Stanley Katz and Emma Katz,
as sellers, and Reynold Nelson and Mary Jean Nelson, as
buyers. (Ex. 18)
3.

In early 1974, Defendant sought to liquidate some

of his rental properties for the purpose of raising money to
purchase a new personal residence for Defendant.

During

this period of time, Defendant entered into a listing agreement with A & B Realty Company, a licensed real estate broker,
for the purpose of selling the property at 1161 East Bueno
Avenue.

Defendant dealt with A & B Realty through Emily

West and Lynn Austin, agents, who were employed or engaged
on behalf of A & B Realty to enter into leasing agreements
for the purpose of selling property for a commission.
(Tr. 87, 132-133, 157)
4.

On or about March 2, 1974, Plaintiff observed

the A & B Realty "For Sale" sign placed at 1161 East Bueno
Avenue and contacted Marcia Evans who was employed or engaged
on behalf of A & B Realty for the purpose of buying and selling
property.

Mrs. Evans had previously assisted Plaintiff in

the purchase of several properties during the preceding two
years and agreed to present an offer on his behalf to the
Defendant. (Tr. 13, 84)

-4-

5.

Utilizing the information obtained in the multiple

listing service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, Plaintiff
informed Mrs. Evans of the terms and conditions upon which he
was willing to purchase the Bueno property.

Plaintiff offered

to pay $10,600.00 total purchase price which consisted of
$100.00 earnest money, approximately $5,500.00 on delivery of
a deed or final contract of sale, and to assume the prior
obligation (termed as a mortgage) of approximately $5,000.00
with monthly payments of $75.00 to include taxes and insurance.

Other terms and conditions were included by Plaintiff

which are evidenced by the Earnest Money Agreement.

Plaintiff

specifically requested that Mrs. Evans write in the date of
March 8, 1974, as the proposed closing date of the sale.
(Tr. 13-15, 86, 158)
6.

On or about March 3, 19 74, Mrs. Evans delivered

the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase to the residence of Defendant.

At this time Plaintiff's check for

$100.00 payable to A & B Realty was attached to said Earnest
Money Agreement and was in the exclusive control and possession of Mrs. Evans.
7.

(Tr. 87, 174; Ex. 1, 3)

On or about March 3, 1974, Defendant submitted a

counteroffer for a total sales price of $11,600.00 and executed
his signature therein. (Tr. 87; Ex. 3)
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8.

On or about March 3, 1974, Mrs. Evans physically

returned the Earnest Money Agreement to Plaintiff at which
time Plaintiff made a further counteroffer of a total sales
price of $11,100.00 and executed his signature therein.
(Tr. 16, 87; Ex. 3)
9.

On or about March 3, 1974, Mrs. Evans again returned

the Earnest Money Agreement to the residence of Defendant, at
which time Defendant agreed to the terms of said second counteroffer and affixed his signature.
1Q.

This Agreement was valid and binding upon the

parties and was not ambiduous.
11.

(Tr. 87)

(Tr. 221)

On Sunday, March 3, 19 74, Mrs. Evans delivered

the executed Earnest Money Agreement and the Plaintiff's
check for $100.Q0 to A & B Realty.

Subsequently, a receipt

was given dated March 4, 19 74, to Plaintiff showing the $100.00
had been deposited with A & B's trust account. (Tr. 90; Ex. 2)
12.

Between March 3, 1974 and March 7, 1974, A & B

Realty ordered a preliminary title report from Pioneer Title
Company.

(Tr. 88, 114)
13.

On or about March 7, 1974, Mrs. Evans received

the preliminary title report which indicated that (a) title
to the property was in the name of Thomas H, Kirschbaum and
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Suzanne S. Kirschbaum as joint tenants; (b) a federal tax
I
lien against the Defendant in the amount of $2,726.67 was
imposed against the property; (c) excepted two previous
warranty deeds for failure to list marital status at the
time the deeds were executed; and (d) did not disclose what
interest, if any, the Defendant had in the property. (Tr. 120j
Ex. 4)
14.

On March 7, 1974, Mrs. Evans advised Defendant

of these title problems.

Defendant instructed Mrs. Evans

to clear them as soon as possible so that a closing could
be accomplished.

She agreed and contacted the Plaintiff and

informed him of these problems.

Plaintiff concurred that she

should attempt to clear these problems as soon as possible.
(Tr. 89, 120)
15.

On March 8, 1974, Plaintiff had available funds

from his father and from his own sources to make the payment
required by the Earnest Money Agreement.

Neither Defendant

nor A & B Realty requested any payment be made at that time.
No offer to pay the money was made by Plaintiff.
16.

(Tr. 21, 82)

Plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform

his part of the Earnest Money Agreement and acted in good
faith in attempting to close the transaction at all times.
(Tr. 33; Ex. 5, 6, 7, 10)
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17.

On March 25, 1974, Mrs. Evans conferred with

Defendant and his attorney, Mr. Perkins.

At no time during

said conference was Plaintiff or his agent given notice of
Defendant's intent to abandon, waive, or rescind the Earnest
Money Agreement.
18.

(Tr. 91, 126, 133)

On April 15, 1974, at the law offices of Richard

Perkins, a meeting was held for the purpose of closing the
transaction.

At the meeting were Defendant, Richard Perkins

(his attorney), Lynn Austin, and Emily West, listing agents
for A & B Realty, Plaintiff, Craig S. Cook (his attorney),
Marcia Evans, agent for A & B Realty, and Bill Fagergren,
broker for A & B Realty.

Plaintiff was prepared to close

the transaction pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement at
this time.
19.

(Tr. 21, 94, 133)
At said meeting, Plaintiff had checks totaling

$5,750.00 and supplemental funds for any discrepancy and
showed said checks to Marcia Evans and to Bill Fagergren,
agent and broker for A & B Realty, respectively.

At no time

did Defendant or agents from A & B Realty request that this
money be deposited with them, and Plaintiff did not offer to pay
over the money.

(Tr. .28, 63, 103, 134; Ex. 6, 7)
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20.

At the meeting it was learned that the federal

government would not release tax liens on property for either
90 or 120 days after a check had been deposited with the
agency.

(Tr. 101)
21.

At this meeting Plaintiff examined certain state-

ments of Defendant's account with Dr. Kirschbaum concerning
the Bueno property and inquired why there was no showing
that taxes and insurance had been computed into the balance
owing to Dr. Kirschbaum.
22.

(Tr. 26f 101)

It was then mutually agreed among all parties

that the tax lien should be officially released and that
a correct balance of Defendant's equity ih the property should
be obtained from the banks by recomputing the taxes and insurance from the previous seven years.

Richard Perkins,

Defendant's attorney, specifically stated that it would be
impossible to close the transaction until these matters were
concluded.
23.

(Tr. 27, 64, 102, 165)
It was then mutually agreed by all the parties

present, including Defendant and Defendant's attorney, Richard
Perkins, that Marcia Evans should secure a release of the tax
lien and take any steps necessary to obtain a corrected balance
satisfactory to both Dr. Kirschbaum and Defendant.
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(Tr. 27, 102)

24.

Subsequent to this meeting and sometime in the

latter part of April, a new balance was computed by Mr.
Stanley Katz, as authorized and agreed upon by Dr, Kirschbaum,
which resulted in a reduction in Defendant's equity. (Tr. 103;
Ex. 11)
25.

During the latter part of April or early May,

Mrs. Evans informed Defendant that the tax lien had now been
released and that a balance had been recomputed and that,
therefore, a closing could be held at any time subject to
his approval of the recomputed equity interest.

Defendant

informed Mrs. Evans he was not interested in closing and hung
up the phone on her.
26.

(Tr. 103)

A closing pursuant to the Earnest Money Agree-

ment could have been made during the first week of May, 1974.
(Tr. 103)
27.

In the latter part of May, Marcia Evans again

telephoned Defendant and informed him that a closing could be
accomplished at any time.

Defendant then informed Mrs.

Evans that he was "out of the financial woods" and considered Plaintiff to be in default so that Defendant had no
further obligation to comply with the Earnest Money
Agreement.

(Tr. 105)
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28.

On or about June 1, 19 74, Plaintiff attended a

closing of his part of the transaction at the offices of
A & B Realty with Marcia Evans and Bill Fagergren.

At that

time, Plaintiff gave A & B Realty a cashierfs check for the
amount owing to Defendant for his equity interest in the
amount of $5,038.32 as computed by Dr. Kirschbaum's agent,
Stanley Katz, and adjusted to that date.
29.

(Tr. 37, 40)

Plaintiff has at no time sought more than an

assignment of Defendant's contract subject only to evidence
of a legally enforceable claim of right to good and marketable title at the time of executing the assignment document
and paying the purchase price.
30.

(Tr. 70,218)

The property located at 116^ Bueno Avenue has

been rented by Defendant during the pendency of this lawsuit
and is reasonably worth $110.00 a month in rental value from
June 1, 19 74 to the date of this order.
31.

(Tr. 149)

Reasonable attorneys' fees from the time of

filing this Complaint to the time of this order is equal to
$1,725.00.
32.

(Tr. 194-195)
Reasonable interest to be charged against Plaintiff

on $5,038.32 as deposited by him in his bank account is 5-1/4%
per annum.

(Tr. 223)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ORDERING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER
TO PURCHASE.
A.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase

Clearly Evidenced the Intent of the Parties and was Legally
Binding.
Appellant Hayes throughout the trial and in his brief
argues that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
(Fx. 3) is ambiguous and unclear and is not the true intentions
of the parties.

Such argument is completely without merit.

The Agreement calls for the sale of the property
located at 1161 East Bueno Avenue and states that the total
purchase price is to be $10,600.00.

It further states that

$5,500.00 will be paid to Defendant upon delivery of "deed
or final contract of sale" which shall be on or before March
8/ 1974.

The contract further provides that Plaintiff is to

assume a "mortgage" of approximately $5,000.00 with monthly
payments of $75.00 including taxes and insurance.

Finally,

the receipt states that the seller agrees to furnish "good
and marketable title with a policy of title insurance in the
name of the purchaser."

In addition to the terms of the

contract itself, the legend of the Agreement states "this
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may be a legally binding form, if not understood seek other
advice."
Defendant has not contented at any time during these
proceedings that the terms of this contractt are erroneous.
That is, at the time the Agreement was entered into Defendant
was to receive a cash-out of approximately $5,500.00 and Plaintiff
was to assume an obligation of approximately $5,000.00.
Defendant argues that this Agreement requires him to deliver
a warranty deed which he cannot supply since he has a mere
assignment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The language

quoted above refers to "final contract of sale" which allows
for an assignment of a contractual interest.

Moreover, it is

uncontroverted that Plaintiff has never expected any more than
an assignment of Defendant's interest in this contract and
has specifically prepared papers of assignment and not papers
to transfer a fee title.

(Tr. 76, 136, 218-219)

In addition, at the time the Earnest Money Agreement
was presented to Mr. Hayes and during the entire time preceding
this lawsuit no objection was raised by Hayes or his attorney
that any ambiguity or error existed in the Earnest Money
Agreement.

(Tr. 127,181)

Defendant Hayes testified that he con-

sulted with his attorney, Mr. Perkins, about this transaction.
(Tr. 159-160)

Hayes made no objections during the time preceding

this lawsuit that the Earnest Money Agreement attempted to impose
on him any conditions to which he had not already assented.
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As such,

he is in no position to claim a right to recission.

Johnson

v, Jones, 164 P.2d 893 (Utah 1946).
Defendant also argues that he was under no obligation
to furnish good and marketable title with a policy of title
insurance and in fact testified that he did not know a title
search would be made.

(Tr. 158)

At the same time, however,

he testified that he did not read the "fine print" of the
contract in which the requirement for title insurance is contained.

(Tr. 159)

It is well settled that except in extra-

ordinary circumstances a person who, having the opportunity to
read a contract but fails to do so is bound by the terms
of such Agreement.

Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, 234

P.2d 842 (Utah 1951).

Besides this point, the title report

was ordered by A & B Realty which was acting as the broker
and agent for Defendant.

Obviously, Defendant's own agents

would not have ordered such a report if it had not been
agreed to by Defendant and was clearly indicated in the Earnest
Money Agreement.
For these reasons, the Earnest Money Agreement in
itself is clearly valid and binding upon both parties.

B.

Any Delay in Performance of the Earnest Money

Agreement Was Caused Solely by Defendant's Own Actions or Inactions.
A review of the record will show that any delay in
the closing of the Earnest Money Agreement was caused solely
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by Defendant.

The first delay was caused when Defendant was

unable to produce a title report showing any chain of title to
himself; the second delay occurred when Defendant had failed
to properly account for the money he

had been paying on his

contract which resulted in an unascertainable balance for
Huck to assume.
Defendant attempts to excuse th^se delays by arguing
(1) Plaintiff defaulted; (2) Plaintiff was unjustified in
requiring a title report; and (3) Plaintiff should have
tendered the amount owing to Defendant.

Plaintiff would submit

that these arguments, together with the supposed ambiguity
of the document, were "designed to avoid a bargain regretted."
Woodard v. Allen, 1 U.2d, 220, 265 P.2d, 398 (1953).

In fact,

if the truth be known, Defendant "turned sour on the deal"
because he was out of the financial woods and there was no
further point in selling.

(Tr. 105, 178, Hayes Deposition

38)
A review of the facts in light of the evidence as
believed by the Trial Court, reasonably support the Trial
Court's findings and conclusions.

Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d

246 (Utah 1976); Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d. 139, 478 P.2d
327 (1970).
First, Defendant claims that the date of March 8th
was not subject to change or modification and that the failure
to close by this date constituted a default and entitled
Defendant not to sell the property to Plaintiff.
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Legally,

the Earnest Money Agreement did not mandate that the closing
had to be by March 8, 1974.

In equitable cases, time is not

ordinarily regarded as of the essence of the contract in the
absence of an express stipulation or an implication from the
nature of the contract or circumstances of the case.

17 Am.

Jur. 2d 768, Contracts, Section 332. Parties to a written
agreement may always change its terms by oral stipulation.
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co.

146 P.2d 284 (Utah 1946).

Factually, the evidence showed the March 8th date
was not absolute or unyielding.

The March date was supplied by

Mr. Huck because of his desire to rent out the property Hayes never expressed any definite date.

(Tr. 15, 1958).

Mrs. Evans, agent for A & B Realty, testified she called
Hayes and told him of the title problem and he said to clear
up the problems as quickly as possible.

(Tr. 90)

It is

customary in the real estate business to postpone or delay
closing dates for various reasons, including title deficiencies.
Although Defendant changed his testimony on several occassions,
he admitted that he would have closed the transaction up to
April 15th.

(Tr. 179)

This conduct certainly allowed the Trial Coui

to conclude that the date of closing had been mutually modified.
In addition, the Trial Court found, as was justified by the
evidence presented, that neither Defendant nor his attorney ever
gave notice of any intent to abandon, waive, or rescind the
Agreement because of the failure to close by March 8th. (R. 132)
As stated previously, any delay which resulted in
the closing of this transaction was caused solely because of
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Defendant's inability to deliver evidence of marketable title
and h i s f a i l u r e to p r o d u c

r ~e

• _ .. \.~ .<± .-.

These

corrections were being carrier on b; /• % •? Realcy Company,
the broker-agent of Defendant.

It is therefore .:^f~ic» It

t : I magi ne how the Trial Court cou i-; ^3™? coneI u- -^o chat
Plaintiff defaulted i:\ the contract by failing to close
before the March R
Secondly, *-~— Defendant argues that Plaintiff was
- - --: st: - .--

unjustified in requesting a title report and
upon -evidence of marketable ri^i^.
Line 45 and 4-

Thi s argument i.° without merit.

: the Earnest Money Agreement (Plaintiff's

Exhibit 3) states:
"The Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable
title with abstract brought to date or at seller1s
option a policy of title insurance in the name of
the purchaser."
T h e u n d e r l i n e d p o r u u n of

** - ••-'•*•-"-.<•

*

.**•.-

-*

.< ^

t h a t a p o l i c y o f -^itle i n s u r a n c e w a ^ t- re t h e e x c i u s i / e m e t h o d
of f u r n i s h i n g t i t l e .
thi-

rrrovis

D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d h e d i d n o t ever rp.^-J

•

_••.-• i :iw is settled t h a t w h e - ^

seller a g r e e s t,c furnish m a r k e t a b l e title, a r e p o r t or a b s t r a c t
.-; in t.n^ seller a s ib t.jVLdenced

m u s t o n its face s h o w a y .

•

by d chain ot conveyances

" -• . Jur. 2d 426, 434, Vendor

and Purchaser^ Sections 26 i , ,<?" .< * Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P. 2d
867 (Cai, Apr-

1958)

jor,.: -- r^eeran, 505 P. 2d 710 (Kan, 1973).

Defendant: relies upon the eas^s of this Court
other jurisdictions in which the ge---'<:
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r \ -

and

-• - \.i- ec *'--.at a

purchaser may not recover his down-payment or seek recision
on the ground of unmarketability of title prior to the time
provided for delivery of the deed.

Plaintiff does not dispute

these cases nor the reasoning behind this rule.

Obviously,

a seller should be free to encumber property with an additional
mortgage or the like during the time a buyer is making payments
provided that at the time the warranty deed is to be executed
the encumbrances have been removed.

However, this is not the

case in the present situation and comes within an exception
to this rule.

It has been stated:

"An exception is made in the case of misrepresentations of the title by the seller, particularly if the
encumbrances revealed are relatively substantial or
if the seller is wholly lacking in title. A distinction is drawn between the implied promise that
a marketable title will be conveyed in the future
and a breach of a representation or warranty that
certain facts exist presently. In case of a breach
of a latter, the purchaser is not obligated to
continue with his performance on the assumption that
the breach will be remedied." Friedman, Contracts
and Conveyances of Real Property, Page 313.
(Emphasis added)
This reasoning is in accord with the further exception that a
buyer after having contracted with a seller is not obligated to
make further payments if there is no possibility the seller cannot
convey good title.

American Savings and Loan Association v.

Blomquist, 24 U.2d 35, 465 P.2d 353, 355 (1970).
Defendant throughout this litigation has failed to
note this distinction.

In the instant case, the title report
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sh:

v^

-

- -^

-

• - ,-: :)

<• ;

baum and Suzanne i. Kirschbaum

: -"4

"*

(Exhibit -

:

.-

'*•-.• • c h -

Defendant

asserted that ^. r.h^ * ime of -he Earnest Money Agreement he
showed to 2 i ^ ,.• .-ea.-

^;en^~ M S assignment of contract from

Reynold Nelsor. t: himself.
(Tr

] .08 ) .

"his was disputed by Mrs. Evans

(Exhi bit 1! 8; Tr

II: :,

• • -s nnd -i sputed , howeve. r ,

that M r s . Evans did not obtain copies oi

the assignment between

Katz (the seller mentioned in. the Hayes assignment) and Kirschbaum (the holder of the fee title) until she received written
permission from, Kirschbaum to obtain the files at Tracy~Ooi_.ns
(!|,y

and Western Savi no9

' tfh 2 le Mrs. E1;; ? ar

recall the exact date she obtained this document

.: •:.";- ot

* is evident

that it was not until after March 18, 1974, the date of the
letter informing ~er t-o c o m a e

A

-\i . -at7.

("Ex. ,

Defendant, ^r n. s ^1 or, argues that the warranty deed
(Ex. .1 9) con/v eyi r

•'.-•*

^r;: t r • o-r-: t: w i th

the fact that Kirschbaum war receiving payments from Defendant
evidenced marketable title in Hayes (Defendant's brief, pp.
7-8).

S'.3ch an argument is clearly without merit*

The

warranty deed itself makes no exception to the contract entered
i>.-r

^--VA**

iE>, ±r}

- ., v - ... *;._._,.

There ^-is .

„.. -

- •-••^:L--

— - an assigi lee.

: ecordea documer - s even snowing that a con-

tract A-^C. -atstandinc <^n K,r^chbaum's seemingly free ann --lear fee
;, - - \

title

vi y b-=.:--v oa^e *.. r •. rs-jnrsun

was no indication tha~ Kirschbaum recognized any right or bad
any c

-- r

•

•" --..*

~.- -- --• ^->-' - of t i I .3 e

""-v. J^ 1 y #

a t the uiittc- of t;:t: Maici ot;i j - ^ e and f-vr a c o n s i d e r a b l e period
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after this, there was no evidence of Defendant's right to claim
any interest in the property held in fee by Dr. Kirschbaum.
It was Defendant's position throughout the trial
that he should have received his money whether or not he had any
title at all.

(Tr. 160-161; 187-188)

Hayes testified that

he did not know the status of his title at the time of the
offer but merely went on good faith that things were all
right (Tr. 183, 189)
If a person such as Defendant wishes to purchase
property on "good faith" then he is surely entitled to do
so.

However, as the Trial Court said in referring to obtaining

preliminary title reports, "we have all been aware of too many
cases where that hasn't been done and people have been sadly
robbed of money." (.Tr. 116)
Plaintiff's principal concern in entering into the
contract was: "That if I perform the terms of the contract, that
I someday would receive title."

(Tr. 76)

Plaintiff Huck

never expected Hayes to convey a fee title to him after learning of Hayes' contractural interest.

(Tr. 76)

If anything,

it is Huck not Hayes who has the right to complain about Hayes'
contractual interest.

As stated by the California Court:

While a vendor may not force a defective title onan unwilling purchaser or compel performance while
conditions precedent to his recovery remain for
him to perform, he cannot defend an action for
specific performance on the ground that his title
is not so complete as the one he agreed to convey.
If the vendor has any interest in the property he
has contracted to convey, the vendee, at his option,
may enforce the contract with respect to whatever
interest the vendor possesses, and may also receive
compensation for the deficiency in performance.
Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P.2d 867, 873 (Cal. App. 1958)
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This Court i n Johnson v. J o n e s , lb4 P.zd 893
(1946), in a case involving an Earnest Money Contract subs tanti a 11y s iin,i ] ar to the • :>i Ie i n th i s case , recoqn i z ed that
a seller is bound by the specific terms r~

the instrument

and m u s t fulfill such terms as furnishing an abstract showing
m a r k e t a b l e titl e.

To say, therefore ,

- Defendant ax: g ties 1 ::1 I at

Plaintiff was required to p a / Defendant over $5,0' 00.0 0 I n
:

,. i •

* a I n t i f f c o u 1 d 1 a t e r c h a 11 e n g e

rhe title i-r, cen or : if teen years at the conclusion of h is
additional payments of -5>S^~„ o is clearly against logic and
any legal precedence*

'i^.A'iiz

requested no more thai I he

was legally entitled T O XIIOV * . • £ . whether Defendant had any
sa lable interest: I n

~ •...-* -

? ny f ai i ] t i n Defendant

being unable to supply such information m u s t be borne by
Defendant a] one.
Third. Defendant argues tnat Plaintiff tailed to
tender his money on March 8th which terminated any contractual

First»

it presumes that M a r c h - th was c f;x-c dare -.-^

-:ould

not be changed regardless of trie uren^io-'S ^f *-^^ parties
As stated p r e v i o u s l y , there wa- .-,*. — :: . .- that this date could n o t be changec
r

any ci rcumstances d i ctat ing
yielding.

"

H

-• - : •- .•« - -: »•

y agreement nor w e r - *-.^ere

* ' ': :•

- s - f^ -<« " d; i un-

The deposition testimony of Hayes w h i c h w a s read

into the records showed tha- Hayes had waived the March 8th
date and w a s pr epared -^

•_ •

on both Marcl i 25 th and Apri 1
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16th but that problems kept preventing the closing.
(Tr. 176-178)
It is a well-settled rule of law that the sellers
agreement to furnish an abstract or title insurance showing
marketable title is a condition precedent to the payment of
any purchase price by the buyer.

77 Am. Jur. 2d 434,

Vendor and Purchaser, Section 273; Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P.2d
867 (Cal. App. 1958).

It is equally clear that a failure to

make a tender may be excused or a tender may be waived and
made unnecessary by a declaration, act, or omission of the
person to whom tender is due.

86 C.J.S. 559, Tender Section 5.

From the evidence before the Trial Court it was proper for
the Court to conclude that all of the parties and their agents
mutually agreed that the March 8th closing date would be
postponed until evidence of marketable title could be obtained
through the efforts of A & B Realty.

It was undisputed that

during this entire period of time including the March 8th
date, Mr. Huck had available funds sufficient to make the
tender had it been necessary.
Likewise, during the April 15th attempted closing, it
is uncontroverted that Plaintiff Huck had the funds available
to pay to Hayes and had shown them to both the broker and
agent of A & B Realty.

This time, however, through the fault

of Defendant it was impossible to ascertain the amount that
was to be paid to him.

Again, any required tender is excused

where the amount depends on a balance shown by accounts which
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are inexcessible to the party who must make the tender
7 4 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Tender Section 4,

If this were not

enough, there wa s amp] e evidence for tl: le Tr ia 1 Coi irt to
conclude that all parties mutually agreed that a new balance
*:s- * tr- computed before an^ ^ ,r ie ,? co-jli l^e

wc;lr. h a w
in

..-._-;,..

(Tr.

64,

. --

*

• - -_ ^ ^ ^*. -.: - . o .

r

ra-- '-±na,

-* e

. '•

r ^ f c_ -

*

-

v. Johnson, 525 7.1: -; */:t:ah ,f^i

„ ? r r, c :

.n th-^: argument r-:a~

Plaintiff dia not a^*~ :n «-^o - raith ov railing \^
purchase price to Defendant

., : •

4

N-

However, in spite of Defendants

assertions, this case- :s readily distinguishablei n Fischer the P] a:

tender

*

First,

: . i :.:\, I tc pay to Defendants

$ 3,000.00 at the time Defendants approved the sale.

Obviously,

there was no concurrent condit ion or conditions precedent
after such approval.

Here, the Defendant was ob] igateci to

furnish evidence of marketable title before a tender was
required.
Second, the Court found that the Plaintiffs were
net prepared to tender and did not tender the $3/000.00 preit jjih _te to er-* - r * ;

n ..o the coi ltract.

5 "iirtheriiioi: e, the

Plaintiffs did not indicate they had available the $75,000.00
whi ch was to be pa i d i ipon the execi 11i oi i o f the contrac t
this case f however, the evidence is uncontroverted

that

Plaintiff at all times had the available funds to pay to
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In

Defendant and was, in fact, fully prepared to pay him on
March 8th and April 15th.

There is no evidence whatsoever

in this record that the Plaintiff did not attempt with reasonable diligence and good faith to do what he was required
to do.

See also Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P.2d 867, 869 (Cal.

App. 1958)

("It should be noted that there is uncontradicted

evidence that at all times during the period of the escrow,
buyer was in a financial position to make the final deposit
of $24,500.00")
For the preceding reasons, the arguments advanced
by Defendant must fail.

The Trial Court correctly followed

the legal precedence in cases such as this and applied it to
the facts.

In the absence of legal error Defendant's only

other ground for relief is that the facts were unsupported
by evidence.

This too must fail.
POINT II

A REVIEW OF THE RECORD IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND
THE CREDABILITY OF THE WITNESSES REASONABLY SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS.
This Court in the case of* Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d
246 (Utah 1976) made the following statement which is analagous
to the arguments raised by Defendant in his brief:
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In appealing this case, Brady se^ms to enjoin
this Court with a principle to the effect that
the evidence should be reviewed by taking as
true everything he aduced, to the exclusion
of any evidence admitted at the beheast of
his opponents, irrespective of its weight/
credibility, or admissibility - to which
thesis we cannot prescribe. 546 P.2d at 24 8.
^*

I'he Findings oi .Fact are Amply Supported by
the Evidence*

Defendant makes numerous complaints about specific
findings ot luf entered by t ht Trial C nirt
pp. 10-17)

(D^f . Hrit t

Finding No, 5 is obi acted to since it states:

"Plamtitf specif icdll; request M(f that Mrs. Evans write in t±ie
date of March ft, 197 4 as the proposed closing date or the
sale. "

Obviously , it the time the offei was marie, the date

could only be proposed since Hayes eoul I always refuse and
change the date to his own likinq.

Regardless of the initial

writing, as discussed supia, this ilafe w s mutually extended
by both parties in vievv of the circumstances of t^e closing.
Fmdinq W

10 is attacked on the grounds that

the agreement was ambiguous and was not valid m l tindina
upon the parties.
ib '(ear i i

'

if

As dicussed previously, the agreement
I ( nil

*n<1 o deniarn hds ever been made

by Plaintiff requiring Defendant to convey an interest which
he does not have.

In addition, Defendant had ample opportun-

ity to change the teririb r i the conti ie ' <»t ( J object in ^hp^i
but never raised these defenses until after litigation.
Th> quoted I tjstjmjrn' 'oncf rrn nq H ^ / P S 1 efforts to show A & B
Realtors what interest he bad (Del

Brief p. 12) only shows

again that any mistakes made were made by Hayes * own agents
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and are attributable to Defendant.

Finally, Defendant argues

that while the offer was not binding or valid because of its
ambiguity, Plaintiff still had an obligation to tender money on
or before March 8th.

(Def. Brief p. 13)

Clearly, if Defendant

had no obligation to convey, then Plaintiff had no obligation
to tender.
Finding No. 14 is consistent with the testimony of
Mrs. Evans (Tr. 90, 120). Even the Defendant stated that
Mrs. Evans may have called him but he could not recall specifically the substance of any phone call.

(Tr. 183)

It is

highly unlikely that an agent working for A & B Realty
Company, the listing and selling firm, would not notify both
parties why a closing would not be accomplished on the date
of the Earnest Money Agreement.
The 16th finding of fact is completely supported by
the record in that there is no evidence cited by the Defendant
showing that Plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of
the Agreement and was acting in good faith at all times.
The 17th finding of fact concerned one of the major
differences at the trial.

Defendant contended at various

times in the pleadings and at the trial that a meeting was
held on March 25th to close the transaction.

This, of course,

is inconsistent with Defendant's other statements throughout
the pleadings and proceedings that he considered a default
to have taken place as of March 8th and that all further
meetings were for the purpose of renegotiating. (Tr. 162, 184)
-26-

T h u s , in on-= ^:^-z:\

: • T r^>—

u^iepza

::. J •-. a •.: t:\v_

-. .-r.--

on M a r c h 8th and in t h e o t h e r b r e a t h states that P l a i n t i f f
£ a i 1 ed t o s how i ip f o i: t h e c 2 o s i n g o i i Ma r c h 2 51h a t wh i c h t ime
the default noti ce was given.
This evidence was specifdeal ** controverted h* i'*Plainti r:

date

av

„• . - - .

-

*-...*-..

*. t

;

, - .

^ a r c * - E v a n s t e s t i f i e d tnat s h e *>az n e t <*.'

'^r . -

w ^irue contemplate*- - closing

*:.. <1, LI 5, I I * , , '-*->.

E v a n s s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n ^ e^ ^"-? >^ar:n'~* a n y c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
regar„ • „ . : < ^ . , _ :
mony
of

^r:

•''?•*

-

,

**. ,

- -

-srkins ii i 1 :i is testi -

a,xl *v..iLair- P a g e r g r e n , t h e b r o k e r In c h a r g e

L

.. fc '

-

~ r :emp] a t e d c.] osi ng i n

• .

M a r c h of 197 4 i?r. ii'S**
T h u s , w h i l e t h e testimony g i v e n b y v:x

Perkins as

ci ted :i n D e f e n d a n t f s brief (Pages ] 5 , ] 6) i s ^ont rar y to
the 17th finding of fact, the Trial Court chose not to
be ] 1 ev e t h i s t e s t i m o ny • a nd i n s 1: : e ad r e 1 i e d u po n 11 i e c o n t r ad : - - o
evidence offered by Plaintiff.
F i n a l l y , D e f e n d a n t a t t a c k s f:i ndings N o , 22 and N o . 23
co? \< ^ r r »i i \a the mu t A ia] a a t -r—:-^.
April J5tn meeting.

.: eac hed: a I the coi I C I U S J oi i of the

This finding is a] so amply supported by

the evidence (Tr. 2 7 , 6 4 , 1 0 2 , 1 6 5 ) . Even Defendant recalled
Perkins saying something to the effect that the figures had to
be recomputed.

(Tr. 165)
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Thus, all of the disputed findings raised by Defendant
in his brief have ample evidence to support them and the Trial
Court did not abuse his discretion in making such findings.

B.

The Credibility of Defendant at Trial Was
Highly Questionable.

One last point should be observed concerning the
findings by the Trial Court.

Throughout the litigation and

during the trial itself the credibility of Defendant left
much to be desired.

A few examples should suffice to show that

the Trial Court had ample reason to believe the Plaintiff's
version of the transactions as compared to Defendant.

First,

Defendant attempted to change the testimony of his
deposition taken on February 1, 1975.

The following was read

into the record at trial:
Question: (By Mr. Cook) Ok. Directing your
attention to page 41, line 10 you will note the
question Mr. Perkins asked you on cross-examination
at that time was, "after the date of March 8th,
1974, did you feel any obligation under the Earnest
Money?"
The original answer in the deposition was as
follows: "Well, a little leeway, you know. I can
see where people would run into a week or ten
days, something, that sort of thing. But when it
runned into over two months, I just couldn't reason
that out. It just was beyond me to comprehend
somebody taking that long to close a real estate
deal."
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Now, y o u crossed that o u t and y o u wrote
"No. I always considered Huck in default under
the Earnest Money Agreement after March 8, 1 9 7 4 .
If I hadn't felt he w a s in default* T would have
sold or closed the sale." Can y o u ^ell us w h y y o u
changed that answer?
A. W e l l , y o u are going u p there and sometimes
you are n o t thinking things clearly. W e didn't
rehearse or anything when w e went up for that
deposition. W e went right straight into your office,
and like I say, I didn't reason things o u t .
(Tr. 162) (emphasis added)
ica a /^::::ed answer
to the Amended Complaint.

"L-s Answer swcrr. vc inder oath

was in direct contradiction cu t^r- iep^s; •• : ^n *: e •- v Lmon} becai lse
the arr idavit states

that both parties had decided tic

waive, abandon and rescind the agreement.
s;itx^r

-. - -

•

«.-:"tf; ur,

A further, I ncon-

-:.- -i*.-_' :;e ^atf--: that

the April 15th meeting w a s to close fh< original Earnest Money
A g r e e m e n t w h i l e i n txie a f f i d a *

•

••

-r : w ed \'r.-

-—\

~*

M as

tor the purpose of re-negotiating a new Earnest Money Agreement,
These inconsistencies ran b<p better seen in the "Memorandum
Su ppc *- - ) f P 1 c. * '

- . .

r\ .f

- : z - sr. s . : j e : e n c a n ' 3

Verified Answer to the .Amended Complaint,*'

<R< 6 1-66" .

As to the affidavit itself. %^f^^,:,. .-,.,..that ne na.: never seen it before

•'"•: . , oB) .

Finally, after.

showing Defendant his signature he admi tted signing *-!-.*=• document
bu -. could not remember whether he had i" ear
upon being asked specifically as to what terms "fail

L

: accurately

be represented by this Earnest Money Agreement" as s'.^- -

the affidavit, Defendant could think of none (Tr. 170-171).
Likewise, upon being asked upon what he based his information
that Plaintiff and Defendant had both agreed to rescind the
contract, Defendant replied that he knew nothing that the
Plaintiff had done to indicate his Agreement.

(Tr. 172-173)

Finally, Hayes ended up disclaiming the entire affidavit:
A: Is that - now, what are you reading from,
the deposition?
Q: (By Mr. Cook)
verified answer.

I am reading from this, your

A: I didnft prepare that, so again, you are getting
off the track.
Q: Do you normally sign things under oath and not
read them?
A: Man, I am telling you, when you are under the
pressure I was, you might do alot of things that
might be irrational.
Q: So, will you want to then disavow this entire
verified answer, say you don't know anything about
it?
A:

I would have to.

(172)
The testimony concerning the March 25th and April
15th meetings are extremely contradictory.

At first, when

asked what the purpose of the alleged March 25th meeting was
Hayes stated that he attended "to see what she had to offer".
(Tr. 175)

Shortly thereafter, he was read his deposition testimony

where he stated:
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Q: What was your intention on going to that
meeting that day?
A:

Getting the money.

Or

Closing :-ie transaction ?

A:

Thau's what I thought it wasj set up for.

Upon the conclusion r.f the reading of his 'deposition the
following dialogue occurred:
Q: (By Mr. Cook) Now, Mr. Hayes, are you saying this
deposition is incorrect, that you weren't intending
to close the transactions on March 25th ;: April 15th?
A: I didn't say that at all.
to be ok'd by Mr. Perkins.

Every t h: --o .,ou -.a nave

- Q: But if Mr. Perkins had okfd it, would you have
closed under this Earnest Money Agreement?
*•

Wei L, -;hat goes without saying.
Well, say it.

Would you have closed?

Finally, i n an attempt to rehabilitate th$ witness, Defendant's
counsel asked the following questions:
Q: (By Mr. Schwobe) Did yo'i intend to do any more
negotiating regarding title problems, etc?
A: I went down - I wanted to see just what let them bring me the deal, see what they had.
'j
DIG you intend to close strictly to the terms
c f r-^at Agreement?
A: It. would have tx be subject to my counsel's
approval. I wasn't ::oinc to sign anything.
Q: Did you :^.
March 25th?

an Agreement by
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A: No.
8 th.

I considered them in default on March

(Tr. 184)

(emphasis added)

Even the testimony of Richard Perkins, Defendant's
attorney, supports his earlier deposition version of the story
that he attended the March 25th meeting for the purpose of
closing from the original Earnest Money Agreement.

Mr. Perkins

stated:
Mr. Hayes called me for the purpose of asking if
I could review some contracts, documents, which
we had in his possession on a proposed sale on
a home at this particular address and indicated
that it was his desire to sell the property, that
we were to meet with the real estate agents and
the broker for that particular purpose. (Tr. 202)
Later Mr. Perkins testified as follows:
I went back to my office and worked on other matters
for approximately 45 minutes. I came back out into
the waiting room where Mr. Hayes was sitting and also
Mrs. Evans. I says, "Bob," I says, "I've got other
commitments and thing to do. Are we going to have
the closing? What's going on?" (Tr. 204) (emphasis
added)
Defendant's own version of the March 25th meeting was
highly contradictory.

As can be seen, in the early part of

his testimony such as at the deposition, he stated that the
purpose of the alleged meeting was to close the Earnest Money
Agreement as written.

However, upon trial and consistent

with his new defense Defendant's attornies have formulated,
Defendant testified that he considered a default to have
occurred on March 8th and that he was only there for the
purpose of negotiating a further deal on March 25th.
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Even this

testimony was inconsistent and repeatedly reverted to the
original "closing" story.
His testimony concerning the April 15th meeting is
equally contradicting.
During trial, Hayes was specifically asked by
Plaintiff's counsel the purpose of the April 15th meeting.
The following dialogue occurred:
Q: When you went to this meeting, did you expect
that you could receive a higher amount than you
had originally contracted for?
A: I just went down to see what they were going
to offer.
Q: So you didn't believe there was any amount due
and owing under this contract at that time; is that
right?
A:

I believed it to be in default.

Q:

I see.

A:

I think I have stated that seven times now.

(Tr. 166)

(emphasis added)

At his deposition previously, however, Hayes stated
that he was prepared to close under the terms of the old
Agreement.

He stated in his deposition:

By that time, I was starting to turn sour on the
deal because I was getting up to the time limit
on my own thing here.
Q: Ok. Now, had the title been clear on that day,
on April 16th, and Mr. Huck had the money for you,
would you have closed it on that date?
A:

Uh-huh.

(Tr. 178)

(emphasis added)
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Then, in direct contradiction of his previous trial
testimony (Tr. 166) he changed his testimony after having
heard the deposition read to him.
Q: (By Mr. Cook) Now, Mr. Hayes, are you saying
that this deposition is incorrect, that you weren't
intending on closing the transactions on March
25th or April 15th?
A: I didn't say that at all. Everything would
have to be ok'd by Mr. Perkins.
Q: But if Mr. Perkins had ok'd it, would you
have closed under this Earnest Money Agreement?
A:

Well, that goes without saying.

Q:

Well, say it. Would you have closed?

A:

Yes.

(Tr. 179)
The above testimony clearly indicates that the credibility of Mr. Hayes could be seriously questioned.
The Trial Court was able to observe the witnesses,
their demeanor, and their sincerity.

The Trial Court carefully

considered the findings of fact and conclusions of law as
evidenced by the amendment of the original findings after
conference with both attorneys.

(R. 110-123; 129-140)

Plaintiff submits that a review of the facts as
adduced under the rules of admissability and competency will
reasonably support the Trial Court's findings and conclusions
and that this Court must accordingly affirm.
546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976).
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Brady v. Fausett,

CONCLUSION

A review of the record including the testimony at
trial and the exhibits offered by both parties reveal that
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid and binding
Earnest Money Agreement for the sale of the Bueno property.
The record further reveals that Defendant had neglected
through the years to insure that he had an interest in the
property which was marketable and such neglect caused a
substantial delay in the contemplated closing of the
Agreement.

The evidence is also clear that the agents of

Defendant, A & B Realty, together with Plaintiff acted in
good faith in an attempt to meet the problems created by
Defendant's neglect.

The record shows that the closing of

the original Earnest Money Agreement would have taken place
on April 15th but for the failure of Defendant to properly
account for the equity balance which was due to him.

The

record also shows that the parties mutually agreed that
this balance had to be computed before any money could be
exchanged.
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In addition, the record is quite clear that when
Defendant found himself not in need of the proceeds of
this sale, he unilaterally decided to cancel the deal.
Obviously, this is not a sufficient reason to rescind a
contractual agreement.
Finally, the record shows that the defenses
relied upon by Defendant were after-thoughts used to
justify his decision not to sell.

The record shows that

the trial court had ample reason to believe Plaintiff's
version of the transaction and to disbelieve the contradictory testimony of Defendant.

The record further shows

that there is ample evidence and legal precedent to support
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and the accompanying judgment.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court
was correct and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

BY AC/ml) JhezJJ
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